Section 08
Netware and Windows 95
08-1. Will Windows 95 cause server problems for Netware?
By default Windows 95 shipped with long file names (LFN) and
Packet Burst enabled, which created a unique problem -- if the server didn't
have long name space loaded (OS/2 name space) it caused problems with files and
occassionally crashed the server. But the worse one was Packet Burst. Unless you
had at least a 3.11 server with the PBURST.NLM up and running, along with
drivers for the server's network capable of handling Packet Burst, the buffer
space used for network connections and/or the buffer space on the network card
created problems ranging from lockups to timeouts to abends.
There were a couple of different fixes you could do, like
updating the server for long name space and Packet Burst (sorry Netware 2.x
users), or you could update the clients' SYSTEM.INI file with the following
entries:
[nwredir]
SupportBurst=0
SupportLFN=0
Alternately, a frame type (802.3) that doesn't support Packet
Burst could be used, and you could enforce no LFNs via system policies.
08-2. Will Windows 95 cause network problems for Netware?
If File & Print Sharing for Netware is configured and you
have non-Windows 95 users, there could be serious network problems. How does
this happen? Here is a very simplified explanation -
The way Netware advertises its file and print services is via
Netware's proprietary (but widely documented) Service Advertising Protocol
(SAP). How to get to these resources is communicated via Routing Information
Protocol (RIP) packets. Both SAP and RIP info are transmitted broadcast style.
Netware servers and even intelligent networking equipment that conform to the
SAP and RIP protocol scheme (like routers) share this info dynamically between
each other.
The problem is when Windows 95 is set up with File & Print
Sharing for Netware, because the Windows 95 workstation does a lousy job of
implementing and interacting with the SAP and RIP info. As any LAN/WAN
specialist will tell you, extra SAPs can quickly waste bandwidth, causing
timeouts and broadcast storms. And that is exactly what Windows 95 does. Netware
3.x and 4.x have released patches, but the easiest thing to do is simply NOT use
File & Print Sharing under Windows 95 -- use Netware's file and print
services like they're supposed to be used, or use Client/FPS for Microsoft
networks instead.
Can hackers take advantage of this? Here's the theory how -
- Turn on File & Print Sharing for Netware in Windows 95.
- On an SLIST the Windows 95 workstation will show up.
- In a Netware 3.x and 4.x environment, there is an internal
network number and an external number. Windows 95 will only show an external
number, and since these numbers help determine how many hops away the service
is, not having an internal one means (depending on your network layout) your
Windows 95 workstation is one hop closer.
- When a regular user boots up, the user needs to get to the
nearest server to find his prefered server's location from the nearest server's
SAP and RIP tables. Routers typically will simply pass on the name and address
of the closest server attached to it. This with the hop counts will lead to a
lot of attachments to the Winodws 95 server. Therfore even a PREFERED SERVER
variable in the NET.CFG would not help.
- To keep clients from timing out with an error, Microsoft
passes the user onto the prefered server IF the Windows 95 server is set up with
the same name.
- In theory could create a \LOGIN directory and run your own
LOGIN.EXE that grabbed the password and then send the client onto it's real
server.
What could prevent this? Well, in a WAN environment a router
could be configured to only allow SAPs to come from certain segments, or every
one of the workstations are running Windows 95 (which is probably Microsoft's
solution). And even though I have heard from a dozen people stating that this
could be done, no one has said they've done it (the alternate LOGIN directory
and trojan LOGIN.EXE).
08-3. What's with Windows 95 and Netware passwords?
Windows 95 has its own password file, and uses this file to
store passwords to Windows 95 itself as well as Netware and NT servers. The
problem here is that the PWL file is easily cracked by brute force, by using
exploit code readily available on the Internet. To keep this from happening
either Service Pack 1 should be applied (see Microsoft) or disable password
caching.
But you can still access the WIN386.SWP file. Either using a
disk utility like DiskEdit from Norton or by booting from DOS, you can access
the swap file and scan it for the password in plaintext. Look for a string like
nwcs and the password will follow that.
08-4. Can Windows 95 bypass NetWare user security?
I am unsure as to the conditions (if anyone knows, please
forward me the info) but if your .PWL file is around 900 bytes versus 600 bytes,
your workstation will log in without prompting you for a password. This bug was
working as of December 1995, and I would think at this point patched via the
latest service pack.
Two ways this can be abused -- on some systems generating the
longer file you can simply make sure you generate a .PWL file with the target
account name and reboot using that .PWL file.
The other way is to simply collect the .PWL file from an
unattended workstation and boot using it (or attack it using the exploit code
referenced in Section 08-3.